CALVIN HORN HISTORICAL SCHOLARSHIP CONTEST RULES

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a. Student must be enrolled in an accredited New Mexico public or private high school in the eleventh or twelfth grades during the school year 1980-1981.

b. Subject matter for the essay is not limited, except that it must pertain to the history of New Mexico as defined by the NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW (see inside front cover).

c. The essay should not exceed 10-15 typed pages, double-spaced, and should conform to the style of the NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW. The essay should also include a bibliography.

d. The essay should reflect the student’s own research into original sources, and should expose new information or give a new viewpoint on previously considered subjects. Resource material may include documentary evidence, oral interview, and other generally accepted sources of historical data.

e. Entries postmarked no later than 1 April 1981 should be sent to Calvin Horn Historical Scholarship Contest, NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW, Mesa Vista 1013, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, 87131.

f. Entries will be judged by members of the staff and editorial boards of the REVIEW based on historical scholarship and quality of presentation. Winners will be announced before 1 June 1981 and in a subsequent issue of the NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW.

g. Scholarships must be used in the academic year following the winner’s graduation from high school.

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“DISFRANCHISEMENT IS A DISGRACE”:
WOMEN AND POLITICS IN NEW MEXICO,
1900–1940

JOAN M. JENSEN

“I HEAR WOMEN are bombarding our two Senators with letters, to Mr. Catron’s supreme disgust and he shows discourtesy to our delegation. I have written to you heretofore, the only hope for New Mexico is federal action.” So wrote sixty-four-year-old Ada Morley to Anne Martin of the Congressional Union on 15 March 1916, reporting on the campaign to have the New Mexico delegation support passage of the Susan B. Anthony woman’s suffrage amendment in Congress. Morley wrote this letter to Martin “on the wing” coming back to her Datil ranch in Socorro County after a run up to Albuquerque for “baby week.” In the previous month she sent out 100 suffrage notes to friends urging them to write to Senator Thomas Catron supporting suffrage. In one period of five days, the furious lady wrote thirty letters. “I am always and ever on the alert to gain my own liberty. Disenfranchisement is a disgrace,” she told Martin in a second letter, adding that she had heard one of Susan B. Anthony’s “masterly appeals” in Washington, that she was now having the life of the eighteenth century feminist Mary Wollstonecraft read to her, and that she believed writer Charlotte Perkins Gilman to be Wollstonecraft’s reincarnation. “I am happy,” she ended the letter.

These letters from Ada Morley, together with other letters in the National Woman’s Party Papers in the Library of Congress indicate the existence of an active women’s movement in New Mexico during the early twentieth century. Forgotten in later years when feminism declined, this early movement for women’s political rights deserves reanalysis not only as a part of women’s history but also as a part of New Mexico’s political history, particularly
because it illuminates the way in which parties dealt with ethnic and sexual divisions in the population.³

Women’s political history in New Mexico can be divided into four periods. During the first period, before the 1890s, no organized women’s movement existed. During the twenty years from 1900 to 1920, women organized political pressure groups and finally achieved suffrage. In the twenty years after passage of the Nineteenth Amendment women moved into voter and party participation and into state and local office holding. Since 1940 the women of New Mexico, like women of other states, have emerged as active political participants at all levels of government except high elective offices, the last bastion of male political supremacy in a system that men once totally dominated. This article focuses on the period from 1900 to 1940 and seeks to answer two questions: Why did women in New Mexico not achieve suffrage until 1920, six years after women in all the other western states had been enfranchised, and what did they do after achieving the vote? To answer these questions, I have used methods from the new political history, including collective biography of political activists and quantitative study of voter participation and office holding, as well as research techniques from women’s history and traditional political history.

Women’s history in New Mexico has not yet dealt with women’s political participation in the state. In the absence of systematic analysis, fragmentary memoirs have become the main source for assessing the historical significance of women’s political activities. Thus, for example, Agnes Morley Cleaveland’s judgment of her mother Ada in No Life for a Lady has not been questioned. In this book, Cleaveland described her mother as a woman who lived a “shattered dream of becoming a cattle tycoon,” a misfit, “tragically miscast” as a range boss bringing up three children after the death of a first husband and the disappearance of a second, her life a “succession of disappointments and failures.” Cleaveland dismissed her mother as something of a crank, saying little about her part in the women’s movement in New Mexico. Older accounts of women’s suffrage in the West omit New Mexico because it was the only western state without woman suffrage in 1914. The official history of suffrage, which the National American Woman Suf-
frage Association (NAWSA) compiled, did no more than list a few suffrage workers from New Mexico and offer a fragmentary sketch of the ratification battle in 1920.4

Political historians have added to this impression that New Mexico women were politically ineffective. Robert W. Larson attributed defeat of women’s suffrage before 1920 to the opposition of Hispanic males. Anglo males, he implied, had no choice but to abandon women’s suffrage, even after suffragists formed a pressure group during the constitutional convention of 1910. Jack E. Holmes, in his pioneering work in the application of quantitative methods to New Mexico politics, did not even mention women’s suffrage or consider sex as a variable in voting trends after 1920 although half the voting universe was female. No one has attempted to reconcile Larson’s conclusions with the findings of Billie Barnes Jensen for Colorado, where she found that not enough support existed in Anglo areas to carry suffrage before the 1890s and that one of the strongest suffrage supporters in southern Colorado was a Hispanic politician from Taos.5

Once one examines the history of women’s political activities, however, several reasons emerge for the delay of women’s suffrage in New Mexico. Before 1900, organized support within the Anglo population—either male or female—was insufficient to make suffrage a real issue. NAWSA, the only national organization devoted principally to achieving suffrage, had numerous subscribers to its Woman’s Journal in Utah during the 1890s but only one in New Mexico. This subscriber, Mamie Marble, reported that the New Mexico legislature, through its “junketing to Colorado,” had left no time to consider a bill for women’s suffrage. The only evidence of NAWSA activity in 1900 is a mimeographed letter to national political convention delegates asking them to support the Susan B. Anthony suffrage amendment in Congress. By 1910, NAWSA had two women listed on its subscription list for New Mexico. One name had “dead” scribbled after it; the other woman was in a Silver City sanitorium. Hardly the base for an active women’s movement.6

Not until the emergence of the women’s club movement in the late nineteenth century did an organizational structure exist capable of exerting political pressure in New Mexico. By the end
of the first decade of the twentieth century, several hundred New Mexico women, apparently almost all Anglo, had organized into nine clubs in which women could work together on civic, educational, and cultural affairs. In 1909, women's clubs federated into a state organization, and one year later the president of the state organization presented a petition to delegates of the state constitutional convention in support of women's school suffrage. That petition signaled women's willingness to organize publicly to demand political rights.  

The constitutional convention of 1910 opened a decade of organized suffrage activities. Resolutions introduced into the convention reflected three possible positions on women's suffrage. The most politically advanced resolution provided that equal political rights could not be abridged on account of race or sex. The most conservative statement called for a referendum by all males and females over twenty one to decide on women's suffrage in the first state election after 1925—fifteen years in the future. The middle position, which organized women supported, stood for immediate partial suffrage in school district elections and women's eligibility to hold public office. Since male voters had already elected women to the superintendencies of public education in Colfax and Roosevelt counties and the territorial governor had appointed a woman to the office of state librarian, some action seemed necessary on office holding as well as suffrage.  

Debates in the convention concerning women's suffrage present an opportunity to analyze relative support by Anglo and Hispanic representatives. Unfortunately, only a few memoirs written many years later and fragmentary newspaper accounts remain of that important convention. Of the three published memoirs, just two mention women's suffrage. One simply says members compromised on women's suffrage; the other notes that "the very nature of New Mexico's background was against giving women the voting privilege with men." These vague comments made years later have led historians to conclude that the Hispanic delegates accepted school suffrage in return for protection of their political rights. A careful analysis of contemporary newspaper accounts does not, however, support the view of two ethnic groups divided over women's suffrage. Instead, accounts indicate a spectrum of
attitudes ranging from support of total suffrage by a small Anglo minority to opposition by a few Anglos and Hispanics, with influential leaders from both groups favoring limited school suffrage. Of the sixty five Anglo delegates, newspapers reported possibly two favoring total suffrage, eleven supporting school suffrage, and two opposed to any suffrage. Newspapers mentioned only two of the thirty-five Hispanic delegates protesting against suffrage, although Solomon Luna, probably the most popular politician in the state, was listed as joining political chieftain Holm Bursum in support of school suffrage. Without the record of roll call votes, one cannot conclude that school suffrage resulted from trading protection of Hispanic rights for women’s rights. In fact, the evidence indicates that compromise on suffrage involved further limitation of the limited suffrage that organized women in New Mexico desired.9

Primary evidence for this conclusion is the compromise that delegates imbedded clearly in Article VII of the constitution of 1910. While the constitution gave women the right to hold school office as superintendent, director, or member of a board of education, Article VII restricted the right of women to vote for these officials if enough men objected. If a majority of voters presented a petition to the board of county commissioners requesting disfranchisement of the women, a majority of the voters favoring the restoration of the franchise had to present a counter petition before women could vote again. No documents remain in the state archives showing how many women did vote or whether this political right was ever taken away (because in county elections both ballots and any petition challenges remained at the county level and were destroyed after thirty days), but this compromise certainly gave women tenuous political rights. In addition, the constitutional compromise protecting the elective franchise of Hispanic males, however that was achieved, made it virtually impossible to amend the constitution to give women the vote. To amend the franchise provisions, three-fourths of the voters in each county had to approve. Women in other western states who achieved state suffrage by 1914 had no such provisions to overcome. Thus, as Ada Morley wrote to the Congressional Union, federal action was their only hope.10
Amid the celebrations of new statehood, then, a small group of women were dissatisfied with their disfranchisement. At first, some of the club women worked through NAWSA, which attempted to expand its activities in New Mexico between 1912 and 1915. Deane Lindsey, an active club woman and former teacher from Portales, became state chairman. NAWSA offered little incentive for New Mexico women to become politically active, however, because it had begun to focus on state suffrage referendums that were inappropriate in New Mexico.11

More important than NAWSA for fueling the engine of women’s discontent in New Mexico was the National Federation of Women’s Club (NFWC) with which the New Mexico Federation of Women’s Clubs (NMFWC) became affiliated in 1914. Committed to an active campaign on behalf of women’s right to public life, the NMFWC joined the vision of a reformed society to an evangelical feminist ideology. “The Feminist Movement,” proclaimed the New Mexico club president in 1914, was a “tidal wave of sentiment,” a cooperative movement of hundreds of thousands of women committed to a better life for American families through better homes, better schools, better babies, and better citizens. To achieve this, the NMFWC supported an extensive program of legislation. Women’s suffrage would make the legislation possible.12

Thus, when the Congressional Union sent its first organizer to New Mexico in 1914, New Mexico club women were ready to act. A splinter group under the leadership of Alice Paul that separated from NAWSA in 1912, the Congressional Union (CU) had adopted the militant and sophisticated pressure tactics of the British suffragettes (as the British called their campaigners). Like their political sisters in Britain, CU organizers adapted the strategy of holding the party in power responsible for any defeat of suffrage in Congress and also the tactic of organizing socially prominent women into pressure groups. Organized women in the forty-eight states would then “make a big noise in Washington” to force delegates to support the national amendment and, finally, compel thirty-six state legislatures (the number needed for passage of the amend-
ment) to ratify. CU leaders additionally expected to mobilize the four million western women who had sufficient votes to threaten the party in power. Although New Mexico women had no votes, CU leaders considered the state important because they assumed organized anti-suffragist opposition would be weaker in the West than in the East and because the New Mexico delegation of three congressmen would be easier to pressure than larger delegations from more populous eastern states. The group of women that the CU pulled together in New Mexico launched its first campaign in late 1915, continued to mobilize during the war, and remained the most active organization during the ratification battle.

Of the four organizers Paul sent to New Mexico between 1914 and 1920, three worked extremely well with New Mexico women. The second organizer, Ella St. Clair Thompson, who arrived in late 1915 liked the New Mexico people very much and was particularly impressed with the women. Letters from New Mexico to national CU officials testified that she, in turn, was well liked. The organizers brought excitement and activity. One young woman wrote from Santa Fe to Thompson after she left: "The old town is as dull and stupid as ever, and it is all I can do to keep from packing my trunk." When the third organizer left in December 1917, another women wrote that the visit had been like a breath of mountain air and that she was committed to working with the organizer. The personal contact of these representatives was crucial to the organizing of New Mexico women, and only during the last campaign of ratification in 1920 did a CU organizer antagonize New Mexico women. By this time, the tactics of the CU had become much more militant. Members had carried banners that condemned President Woodrow Wilson for not supporting suffrage. Many had been arrested, and some had staged hunger strikes in jail. Militants did alienate more men than did the conservative suffragists, in New Mexico as well as elsewhere, but these militant tactics probably paved the way for the more moderate suffragists. In New Mexico, the worst criticism of the last CU organizer, was that she, as one state leader said, "was a Texas Democrat and should not have come into a Republican state."
The New Woman in New Mexico. Bergere Family Collection. Courtesy of the State Records Center and Archives, Santa Fe.
By this time women had begun to move into political parties; bipartisanship was breaking down, and tempers were short in the final push.

The main problem of organizers was identifying local networks and socially prominent women. The first organizer, Mabel Vernon, who arrived in early 1914, began to organize through the New Mexico Woman’s Christian Temperance Association (WCTU). A CU organizer spoke at the state WCTU convention in July 1915, and women then began the letter writing campaign that Ada Morley enthusiastically joined. Because the WCTU had relatively little influence among socially prominent women in northern New Mexico, the CU soon shifted its emphasis to club women. Thompson, who arrived in late 1915, spoke before the women’s club in Santa Fe, located the most influential women in the town, and then, working through the state federation, she urged club women to suggest women in different parts of the state to serve on delegations. Once the state network was set up, Thompson planned the type of pageant that the CU had made famous—a mass meeting, a parade, and a deputation to Senators Thomas Catron and Albert Fall. In addition, Thompson sent delegations to all political conventions, from the smallest division to the state convention. “Please have as much of a bombardment as possible descend upon Congress from these political gatherings,” Paul wrote to Thompson in February 1916. And so the bombardment began.

Once the state network had been set up, Thompson organized the public meeting to climax the work. A president was chosen, and the campaign officially launched. At the meeting, purple, gold, and white bunting along with suffrage flags decorated the hall while speakers explained that the federal amendment was the quickest route to suffrage for New Mexico women. Organizer Doris Stevens summed up the philosophy of the CU: “Congress understands only vigorous and persistent demands and unless such methods are used in dealing with the august body, the amendment will be sidetracked.” Later she told a reporter from the Santa Fe New Mexican: “We women have been meek too long. It is time to be impatient.” Four million women would be voting in the upcoming election, she reminded her New Mexico audience.
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Who did these organizers attract to their purple, gold, and white banners? The women who rallied to the CU call were not representative of various regions of New Mexico, ethnic groups, or classes. (See Table 1 for numbers of cases and percentages.) They were a predominantly Anglo elite centered in Santa Fe, Albuquerque, and other northern cities. Although few of these women gained independence through their personal careers, they had married men among the political and business elite. At a special reception for delegates of the state constitutional convention of 1910, for example, ten women mentioned prominently as presiding or attending later joined the suffrage movement. The women attracted to the CU counted among their husbands and male relatives bank presidents, political party leaders, high officials of mercantile businesses, and lawyers who represented railroad and land syndicates. An overwhelming number of the members’ husbands identified with the Republican Party, the dominant party in the state. These women were exactly the type of persons who the CU had hoped to attract with its recruiting.

By far the largest proportion of the New Mexico suffragists were married, more than half of them between 1890 and 1910. Almost one-third were born in New Mexico, but more than two-fifths had immigrated to the state between 1871 and 1890, primarily from the Midwest. More than half had three to five children. Few had graduated from college, but almost one-fourth of the women belonged to a woman’s club and nearly 10 percent to the WCTU. Whatever this said for their interests, it did show that the suffrage networks spread through groups of women already organized to effect changes in their communities. They were a combination of young and middle-aged, upper middle-class women, both unmarried and married with children.

Both the WCTU and the NMFWC were almost entirely Anglo, but when Thompson arrived she made efforts to recruit daughters of Hispanic politicians. Although CU records mention only six Hispanic women as participating, these six were key women. Aurora Lucero, daughter of the secretary of state, joined. So too did the three nieces of Solomon Luna, including thirty-four-year-old widow Adelina Otero-Warren, who became the most influential New Mexican woman in the CU. To appeal to a broader con-
stituency, Thompson had leaflets printed in Spanish and English for the mass meeting in October 1915. "They say it is very difficult to get the Spanish ladies out," she wrote to Paul on October 15, "but as I have one on the program to speak in Spanish, I think they will come—and their husbands as well." Thompson wrote a speech for Aurora Lucero, carefully emphasizing child welfare in order to convert the Hispanic women, and had the speech translated into Spanish. Even though Otero-Warren was too timid to speak, she particularly impressed Thompson. The Hispanic women seemed pleased with Thompson's efforts. "I speak a little Spanish—very little—but it helps a lot," she reported to Paul.19

But progress was not so smooth in other areas. Ada Morley wrote in discouragement from Datil that Hispanic voters were against them "solid" and that they needed Spanish-speaking suffragists to make the "stony ground" of New Mexico bloom with suffrage sentiment. She was not optimistic. Paul refused to give up, however. Instead, she continued to encourage leadership among Hispanic women, asking Otero-Warren to join the advisory council as vice president. When the head of the state group resigned in September 1917, Paul asked Otero-Warren to head the state group.20 Beginning as a timid woman unwilling to speak in public, Otero-Warren gradually became a political force. Her uncle Solomon Luna, the powerful and popular head of the Republican Party, had died in 1912, but her father was still active in politics, and other Otero males were moving into influential positions in the Republican Party. In 1917, Republicans appointed Otero-Warren school superintendent in Santa Fe, and in 1918 she defeated a male opponent to retain this elective position. She accepted leadership of the New Mexico CU and was soon skillfully evaluating local tensions among factions. "I will keep out of local fuss but will take a stand and a firm one whenever necessary for I am with you now and always!" she wrote to Paul on 4 December 1917.21

Otero-Warren guided the last phase of the campaign to pry the amendment out of Congress. Complaining that extra war work in the schools kept her from doing as much suffrage work as she wished, she nevertheless kept the state group intact through the war and resigned only from the CU to become the chair of the
women's division of the Republican State Committee for New Mexico. When it appeared the state might not ratify in 1920, Otero-Warren stepped up her political activities, working closely with Hispanic Republican leaders to get the amendment ratified. On the last day of the struggle after the Senate had narrowly ratified and the House balked at passing the amendment, she spent three hours in the Republican caucus, reputedly the first woman to ever attend a state political caucus. Writing enthusiastically to Paul in March 1920 that the Republicans had just voted to allow women in the primaries and to be seated at the next convention, she predicted that the women's vote would be a big factor in the next election. Experience with the CU encouraged Otero-Warren to see herself as a politician and to participate in the complex party politics of the time.

Raising the political consciousness of women was a necessary activity of the CU, but mobilizing women to challenge men who controlled the political structure in New Mexico was the ultimate goal. While women in political office might help convince men that women were competent and sufficiently interested in politics, only group pressure could move intransigent politicians to support women's demand for suffrage.

Of the two New Mexico senators, women found Senator Albert Fall the more sympathetic to their cause. Fall invited one delegation to visit his Three Rivers ranch, his wife Emma Morgan Fall served on the original CU committee formed in 1916, and even Ada Morley grudgingly described Senator Fall as "not as dense and obdurate as Catron." Though never an active suffragist, Fall remained a friend to New Mexico women during the nine years he was in office.  

Senator Catron opposed women's suffrage consistently during the six years (1911 to 1916) he represented New Mexico in Washington. In 1911, at seventy-one, the stout and aging Catron had achieved the office of his life's ambition, gladly giving up a declining position in state politics for the Senate, where he reportedly spent from one to two hours every morning in the luxurious baths provided for the Senators. Concerned mainly with higher tariffs, a grazing Homestead Act, and military preparedness, Catron not only opposed women's suffrage, he did it with ill
humor. "He thinks all we are good for is to stay home, have children, have more children, cook and wash dishes," a suffragist complained bitterly after he rebuffed one delegation. Thompson described Catron once as an "awfully cross old thing" but urged New Mexico women to take him seriously. Even Ada Morley, who advised the CU that Catron controlled New Mexico politics "as a cat does a mouse," that he was "as corrupt, as dishonorable a politician as ever lived," and that it was "creditable to have him as an enemy," nevertheless warned that "you need his vote."

Beginning in 1914, a steady stream of women wrote and visited Catron in Santa Fe and in Washington. Some visits went better than others. Thompson reported in October 1915 that at least "he didn't try to wriggle" because she had people in her delegation he cared for, but Catron would not budge. By February 1916, the women were discouraged. In that month, Deane Lindsey wrote to Morley: "I think Catron has been stormed and stormed about the suffrage matter. The Santa Fe women have written and written." Catron steadfastly remained opposed to the Susan B. Anthony amendment and, as a last salvo, even introduced an anti-suffrage statement in the Senate in February 1917.

Women also believed the single representative from New Mexico, Benigno Cardenas Hernandez, would not move as long as Catron opposed suffrage. Morley, with her usual blunt criticism, claimed that Catron controlled the congressman totally; he "simply put Hernandez in Congress before our citizens knew what was being done." While Catron had influenced the political career of Hernandez, the Hispanic representative was a skilled politician in his own right and had as his campaign manager the husband of an active suffragist. Nevertheless, Hernandez did not openly espouse suffrage as long as the senior member of Congress from New Mexico opposed it.

What specific influence women had in insuring Catron's political decline is difficult to determine, but they certainly helped to make Catron a political liability to the Republicans. Although Catron wanted renomination, Republicans nominated the unpopular but prosuffrage Frank Hubbell in 1916. That year for the first time parties in New Mexico supported the woman's suffrage amendment. The CU maintained its nonpartisan stand in the
election of 1916; members of the organization opposed Democrats who would not endorse suffrage and refused to campaign for Republicans. Concerned about women’s political potential, the Republican Party brought a prominent suffragist from California in 1916 to organize Women’s Republican Clubs throughout the state. Dr. Jessie A. Russell, a retired physician, arrived in New Mexico in mid-October for a whirlwind tour. Part of the impetus for the last-minute campaign to win voteless women to the cause was the belief that Frank Hubbell’s unpopularity might take the rest of the Republican slate down to defeat with him. To capitalize on the endorsement of suffrage by presidential candidate Charles Hughes and on the network of women already organized into suffrage groups in the state, Republican managers contacted key women and women’s clubs to urge them to arrange mass meetings. In addition, these women were encouraged to organize Women’s Republican Clubs whose goal was “to aid passage of federal suffrage by aiding the election of Republicans.”

Who benefited most—the Republican Party or suffragists—is difficult to determine. The speeches and publicity surrounding Russell’s tour certainly popularized the suffrage cause. Russell usually scheduled two meetings in each town, the first to present a nonpartisan talk on suffrage or “women in public life” and a second speech later in the day to organize women into Republican Clubs. While the CU had concentrated much of its energies on raising the consciousness of a select few and organizing them to lobby politicians, Russell asked women to participate in a major party structure. Moreover, many men and women attended her Republican-sponsored meetings, thus providing an education for the male voters. Russell saw herself, and the women she spoke to, as part of a “women’s movement” and considered her work as involving women never before interested in public matters. She hoped to attract women with Democratic or Socialist preferences to the new Republican women’s clubs, but at the same time she wanted to strengthen the nonpartisan suffrage movement. She traveled throughout the state, speaking to university women in Las Vegas, organizing a large meeting for Ada Morley at Magdalena, and taking the message to Gallup.

This initial attempt by Republicans offered women political
Mañana es el día de la elección. Es un día de mucha importancia para las señoras de Santa Fé. Esta es nuestra primera participación en una que no sea solamente elección para escuelas, y las señoras se sienten algo tímidas acerca de ejercer sus privilegios; miedosas de dar un golpe recio con una nueva arma. Pero no debemos tener miedo de pegar con todas nuestras fuerzas en defensa de nuestros hogares.

El gobierno de una ciudad, o de un estado, o de una nación queda solo en las manos de sus ciudadanos. Si el ciudadano no ejercita sus derechos y franquicias no tiene derecho para culpar a los que gobiernan, o mal gobiernan, para sus propios intereses. La cuestión en el condado de Santa Fé es una cuestión para un gobierno mejor. Es para hacer nuestra ciudad un lugar mejor donde vivir, un lugar mejor para nuestros hogares, para nuestros hijos. Se nos ha dicho que los hombres de los partidos van iguales, y que si Santa Fé se ha de ‘limpiar’ nosotras las señoras debemos hacerlo.

Con este prospecto ante nosotras, ¿vamos a votar por nuestro partido en el condado de Santa Fé, sin importar el registro de los hombres que están corriendo en el boleto de nuestro partido? ¿Es un hombre un hombre bueno para los pobres porque regala unos cuantos pesos de abarrotes o una carga de leña con una mano, mientras que con la otra permite al jugador que se robe el poquito dinero que tienen los pobres, y a la mujer mala que pone en peligro nuestros hogares? ¿Después de la elección se va a decir que las señoras de Santa Fé han votado para mantener en las oficinas hombres que han probado por sus registros pasados que no sostienen las leyes que ellos han jurado defender? La elección este año en el condado de Santa Fé no es una elección de partido. Es una elección del HOGAR. Por medio de nuestros votos hablaremos en favor de una ciudad más limpia, o bien hablaremos por una continuación de las condiciones presentes. Mientras tales lugares como el “Canary Cottage” y los garitos de juego sean permitidos en Santa Fé, ningún hogar en la ciudad está segura. Esta es la cuestión más importante en Santa Fé hoy día.

First page of the Spanish version of a bilingual appeal to women voters. Miscellaneous Records, Political Issues. Courtesy of the State Records Center and Archives, Santa Fe.
participation in a major party, even if in separate groups; but it offered women no autonomy and no way to articulate their political needs: the women’s movement still held the political lifeline of prospective voters. The Women’s Republican Clubs apparently did not help the party much, for both Hubbell and Hernandez were defeated in the Wilson landslide of 1916. The clubs did, however, give the Republican Party a structure through which to organize women voters once they had the vote and thus an edge over the Democrats who did little to organize women during the first twelve years after suffrage.

The 1916 election put two prosuffrage Democrats from New Mexico in Congress. Although the new representative, William B. Walton, promised the CU to vote for the amendment, he later seemed to waver, and Martin sent a hurried note from headquarters urging Otero-Warren to turn up the political heat: “I think he is a little shaky and needs pressure from his constituents.” This last-minute pressure steadied Walton so that he voted for the Nineteenth Amendment which passed the house in January 1918. Meanwhile, Andrieus Aristiens Jones from Socorro, who replaced Catron in Congress, moved into the chair of the influential Senate Committee on Woman Suffrage. Jones proved his support by visiting CU militants jailed for their Washington protests and saw the Susan B. Anthony amendment out of committee and on to the Senate floor where he worked for its passage.32 The Senate voted favorably in June 1919. After fifty years of independent organizing for suffrage, women had finally pried the federal suffrage amendment out of Congress.33

The political focus now shifted back to New Mexico where the legislature had to approve the amendment. Suffragists were so confident that the amendment would pass easily in the January 1919 session that the new head of the state CU, now calling itself the National Woman’s Party (NWP), made the mistake of leaving for California. With Otero-Warren lobbying among the Hispanics, the amendment passed the House easily; but in the Senate a Republican member sidetracked the amendment by substituting a state referendum measure which, as everyone knew, could not pass.34 This defeat in New Mexico bitterly disappointed both New
Mexico women and national suffrage leaders who hoped New Mexico would be one of the first states to ratify. Twenty-two states ratified the amendment in 1919, including Texas and Colorado, but fourteen more were needed, and the women knew the longer the ratification process, the more opposition would organize against passage. NAWSA also increased its activity in the West that fall with a special trip by leader Carrie Chapman Catt to eight states, including New Mexico.

By this time, antisufragists were labeling suffragists as disloyal and Bolshevik agents. Although most moderate leaders got used to these attacks, Catt felt compelled to spend time refuting claims of the antis that women would vote socialist once they were enfranchised. As the political right began to organize in the postwar period later known for its “red scare,” moderates became distressed about the tactics of the National Woman’s Party. Catt believed that the militant activism during the war, especially picketing the president during the war, had cost women precious support. As the crisis deepened surrounding passage of the amendment, the two major suffrage groups found it difficult to work together, in part because leadership believed in different tactics, in part because right-wing spokesman increasingly attacked the more moderate NAWSA. Intent on keeping the two groups separate, Catt even sent a special emissary to Wyoming to bring that state back into the NAWSA fold after it had strayed into the NWP’s camp; she also traveled to the West to recapture other territory lost to the National Woman’s Party and to gather support for passage of the amendment. She lobbied at the Governors’ Conference in Salt Lake City to gain backing from western governors for ratification. Early in 1920, Arizona and Utah ratified after governors from those states promised support. Governor C. A. Larrazolo of New Mexico promised both NAWSA and NWP leaders passage of the amendment at a special session called for 16 February 1920. If New Mexico ratified as the thirty-second state, only four more would be needed for passage.

Final victory in New Mexico resulted from coalition work by NWP and Republican women. Otero-Warren swung into action in January lining up Republican leaders behind the amendment. When antisuffragists attempted the same tactic that had worked
in 1919, introducing a resolution to substitute a referendum for the resolution ratifying the federal amendment, Paul alerted pro-suffrage Republican supporters to the plot and warned state NWP leaders that they must be on guard against such moves. A Republican secretary informed Paul of a secret meeting in Washington where at least one leader had been brought to line up Hispanic opposition in return for financial support in the next campaign. In a desperate attempt to block ratification in New Mexico, Republican antisuffragists hoped Hispanics could be convinced that women’s suffrage was against their interests and vote it down. Anglo politicians could then blame Hispanic males for the defeat of a law Anglos did not want enacted.38

In addition to a last-minute caucus with Republican leaders, Otero-Warren joined Paul in countering a flurry of telegrams from antisuffrage states in the South with an even larger flurry of supportive messages from states that had ratified. As suffragist women packed Senate galleries to hear the final debate, Republicans shifted to support of the amendment. On 18 February the Senate ratified the amendment 17 to 5. The next day, after a three hour Republican caucus, Dan Padilla withdrew his referendum proposal, Republican leader R. I. Baca shifted to support, and the House ratified 36 to 10. New Mexico became the thirty-second state to ratify. Oklahoma, Washington, and West Virginia followed New Mexico, the final battle occurring in Tennessee where, according to Catt, antisuffragists bought votes and instigated opposition of every sort. On 15 August 1920, however, Tennessee ratified.39 After almost a century of talk about suffrage and more than a decade of campaigning in New Mexico, women had won the vote.

The major problem now for political parties was how to mobilize the new voting public. The Republicans, using lists of women collected in 1916 and tapping leadership developed by the women’s movement, acted quickly to organize women. Women moved into three of the eleven slots on the state executive committee, and fifty-seven women became state committeemen, including eighteen Hispanic women and eight former suffragists. The Democrats also drew four women on to their executive committee and appointed fifty-six women to the county committees, of whom
only two were Hispanic while three were former suffragists. The difference between eighteen and two Hispanic women in the two parties reflected the relative proportion of Hispanics, although Hispanic women were not equally represented with Anglo women in either party.

Although they believed Republican women would vote, Democrats made little effort until September 1920 to get out the women’s vote, when they recruited fifteen women to speak. At this late date it was difficult to form these women into an effective speaker’s bureau. One woman had a small baby to care for, another had no experience at speaking, and a third was recovering from nervous exhaustion after stumping the state for prohibition. Meetings scheduled for one woman had to be cancelled because she was a poor speaker. Only Frances J. Nixon, who spoke primarily on the League of Nations, proved to be an effective speaker and organizer. The chairman of the Speaker’s Bureau was insistent that wherever possible local women make short addresses at rallies and that several women be on the stage. “Our success depends on getting out the Democratic women voters. Bear this in mind;—The Republican Women are going to vote,” he warned. But beyond making women visible, Democrats had no clear-cut policy to attract the new voters. One local organizer suggested “emotional appeals especially to the women”; another recommended picnics to help get women to the polls.\textsuperscript{40} Mainly, the initiative remained with local party loyalists who had gained their position in the party by being able to turn out male voters. Late in the campaign a fusion blossomed with Democratic and Independent Republican women joining to issue a bilingual appeal (“A Las Señoras de Santa Fe” and “To the Women of Santa Fe”) that urged women to choose reform candidates who would eliminate prostitution and gambling—and to vote early before the polls became crowded.\textsuperscript{41} This appeal indicated that reform might be a continuing interest of women.

Overall the parties were successful in getting out the vote. The number of adults participating in the election jumped from 40 percent in 1916 to 62 percent in 1920. (See Tables 2 and 3.) Only an estimated 11 percent more women than men did not vote. Mobilization, voter participation, and the newly franchised
TABLE 2—VOTER TURNOUT AND MOBILIZATION 1900–1916

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1900</th>
<th>1904</th>
<th>1908</th>
<th>1911</th>
<th>1912</th>
<th>1916</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voter Turnout (T)</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilization (M)</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

T = \frac{\text{total vote}}{\text{total population eligible to vote (includes Native Americans, many of whom could not vote)}}

M = \frac{\text{total vote}}{\text{total population over 21}}

TABLE 3—VOTER TURNOUT 1912–1940

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1912</th>
<th>1916</th>
<th>1920</th>
<th>1924</th>
<th>1928</th>
<th>1932</th>
<th>1936</th>
<th>1940</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State*</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic Counties\textsuperscript{a}</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>59%\textsuperscript{**}</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little Texas\textsuperscript{b}</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{a}Includes Guadalupe, Mora, Rio Arriba, San Miguel, Taos.

\textsuperscript{b}Includes Chaves, Curry, De Baca, Eddy, Lea, and Roosevelt.

women can be considered major achievements for New Mexico parties. Although it would take a state referendum to prove that women also had the right to hold office, women campaigned for school superintendent in twenty-one of twenty-nine counties and were elected in nineteen. The governor appointed both Hispanic and Anglo women to every state board, a woman became assistant secretary of state (a position previously reserved to males), and women moved into control of the public welfare board.

Political scientists sometimes list two reasons for the lower nationwide political participation of women than men in the early 1920s: the lack of role models to help women internalize voting and office holding practice and local resistance to women’s voting and holding office. Yet in the years from 1920 to 1940, Hispanic women with few role models and no tradition of participation in formal political structures, expanded dramatically their political
activities. Like Black women after they gained the vote in the 1960s, these Hispanic women became rapidly politicized.  

This dramatic politicization becomes evident by comparing the total mobilization before suffrage with the percentage of adults voting in six predominantly Anglo counties (Little Texas) and a block of five predominantly Hispanic counties. Because women were disfranchised before 1920, the total mobilization of voters was low, with only 27 to 40 percent of the adults voting. (See Table 2.) During the years from 1900 to 1916, male voter participation ranged from 51 to 72 percent in New Mexico with Hispanic counties having a much higher voter turnout than Little Texas counties in 1912 and 1916.  

Regardless of how this turnout was achieved—most historians attribute it to a well-oiled political machine reminiscent of nineteenth century machines that unfailingly delivered the vote among white males—it was impressive. Hispanic women voters moved rapidly into this voting structure. The percent of eligible voters voting in Hispanic counties dipped to 59 percent in 1920, but by 1924, 68 percent were voting, and the count reached a peak of 84 percent in 1936. (See Table 3.) Little Texas counties also had 59 percent voting in 1920, but the percentage decreased in subsequent elections before climbing to a high of only 57 percent in 1936. Anglo women in these Little Texas counties tended to follow the voting pattern of the southern region of the state where women had a low overall voter participation, but Hispanic women immediately became active voters, exceeding the average level of northern women.

Hispanic support also extended to Hispanic women who ran for political office during these twenty years. Perhaps the change was most dramatically symbolized when Otero-Warren ran for the United States House of Representatives in 1922. During a special election held in the fall of 1921 to confirm the right of women to hold office in New Mexico (“para tener oficina las mujeres,” as the ballot read in Spanish) numerous Hispanic males continued to remain opposed to granting this political right as one can see by comparing the county blocks of Hispanic and Little Texas regions. Of the five core Hispanic counties, four defeated the amendment. Of the six Little Texas counties, four passed the amendment by a majority. Republicans expected organized womanhood to support
Otero-Warren in 1922 as the first woman in New Mexico to run for high federal office. Campaigners even took out a full page advertisement in the NMFWC Bulletin to remind club women of her past activities on behalf of women. Otero-Warren did not win enough votes to defeat her male Democratic opponent, but this was not too surprising since the Democrats elected a governor and most of the state officials that year. That she carried four of five Hispanic counties and none of the Little Texas counties was a surprise. This willingness of Hispanics to have a woman represent them in Congress one year after voting against women holding office was a tribute to the ability of political structures to triumph over ideology. The first woman representative from New Mexico to the United States Congress would not be elected until twenty four years later when in 1946 Georgia L. Lusk carried all of the Little Texas counties and none of the Hispanic counties. By then, Little Texas had become so populous that Lusk did not need the Hispanic counties.45

While New Mexico women had to wait twenty-six years after suffrage for their first female United States representative and to this writing have never had a second, Anglo and Hispanic women did move into state office holding. (See Figure 1.) In the election that Otero-Warren lost, New Mexicans elected a Hispanic Democratic woman as secretary of state and an Anglo Democratic woman as state superintendent of public instruction. Women never gave up the position of secretary of state in New Mexico, and women held the office of superintendent of public instruction for most of the years before 1940. Women reached a peak in county office holding in 1926 when they held twenty three offices of county superintendent of education and in 1928 when they occupied ten county clerkships and nine other county positions. By 1938, seven women also sat in the New Mexico legislature, although only one of the women was Hispanic. While these numbers seem meager in relationship to the percentage of women in the population, each of these political offices, with the exception of county superintendent of education which women held from 1908, had been held previously only by men and was much sought after in New Mexico. Moreover, women would have difficulty extending these modest gains after World War II.46
FIGURE 1—NEW MEXICO WOMEN OFFICE-HOLDING 1907–1940

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School Superintendents

County Clerks

County Commissioners, Probate Judges, Clerk County Court

x-x-x- State Representatives
The political situation in New Mexico, rather than the presence or absence of role models, seems to have contributed most to this dramatic change in female political participation and male support for such activity. Because Republicans dominated New Mexico from 1850 to 1911, Hispanic males were able to protect their ethnic interests through active participation in the Republican Party. After 1911, the growth of the Democratic Party, traditionally an Anglo party, made the political position of Hispanics more vulnerable. Hispanic males did not uniformly oppose women's political participation, nor did Anglo males uniformly support it. Instead, the issue of women's suffrage became entangled in the complex web of party loyalties and ethnic fears. Before 1920, few Republican males—Anglos or Hispanic—looked upon women's political participation as crucial to the party, and neither party had any method of organizing women or giving them political training. Hispanics and Anglos reached a political compromise in the state: Anglos controlled most political matters in the legislature in exchange for assurance of jobs for Hispanics. Some Hispanics may have feared women's suffrage would upset this balance, especially if they assumed only Anglo women would be voting or considered Hispanic women as not being capable of political activity. But Anglo males also feared women's political activities. Suffragist organizers probably allayed the fears of Hispanic males by grooming a woman like Otero-Warren for political activism.47

Republican leaders undoubtedly learned from suffragists a number of tactics for mobilizing women politically. And Republicans surely learned from suffragists to take women seriously as a political variable so that when they needed votes in the 1920s it was possible to expand the party machinery to mobilize Hispanic women. When progressive Bronson Cutting began to appeal to the Hispanic vote in the 1920s, many followed him. Cutting, who moved in and out of the Republican party during the 1920s, created a volatile situation for the Republican Old Guard. Because of this political wavering, Hispanic women found themselves wooed as voters by both Old Guard Republicans who needed votes to shore up the crumbling walls of Republicanism and by progressives who wanted to show the Old Guard they were
a real threat. Eventually, of course, Democrats also learned how to mobilize Hispanic women. Unemployment and low farm commodity prices during the Depression of the 1930s swung New Mexico women into the Democratic party, and federal assistance programs helped keep them there.\textsuperscript{48}

The enfranchisement of New Mexico women was significant both to women who attempted to translate their needs into political action and to the male politicians who tried to predict and control women’s votes.\textsuperscript{49} When women voted, their choices affected traditional politics in important ways; where they did not vote, their abstention also affected politics, if only by allowing politicians greater power in determining policies. Although New Mexico women entered politics at a time of declining male participation nationally, Hispanic women, like Hispanic men, retained high voter participation in New Mexico. The implication of this pattern is important to present voting, for Hispanic populations in other southwestern states are now increasing participation previously restricted by gerrymandering and other forms of disfranchisement. The potential strength of Hispanic voting and the strong bargaining position Hispanic women have within their ethnic political groups will be crucial factors as the Hispanic population comes to political power in the Southwest.

\section*{NOTES}

The author would like to thank Darlis Miller of the New Mexico State University History Department and Janet Clark and José Garcia of the Government Department for criticism of an earlier version of this paper.


2. Morley to Martin, 2 March 1916, tray 12, box 1, NWP Papers, LC.


8. Resolutions are in Santa Fe *New Mexican*, 18 October, 20 October, 9 November 1910.


10. Myra Ellen Jenkins, former chief, Historical Services Division, State Records Center and Archives (SRCA), Santa Fe, to author, 7 November 1979.

11. Lindsey was state chairman from 1913 to 1919. Catt sent Lola Walker and Gertrude Watkins as organizers to New Mexico. Harper, History of Woman Suffrage, 6: 434–39. Lindsey also signed a 1916 petition to the Republican National Convention as the New Mexico representative, NAWSA Headquarters, Newsletter 11 (June 22, 1916):15. No New Mexico correspondence exists in the NAWSA files in the Library of Congress. One letter from Lindsey to Frank Hubbell, 9 September 1916, asking his position on suffrage was written on her husband’s stationery and is in the Thomas Benton Catron Papers, Sect. 408, box 1, folder 19, UNM-SC.

12. New Mexico Federation of Women’s Clubs, Yearbook 1 (1914): 10, 16. State legislation desired was equitable community property laws, placing women on boards of state institutions, and a state board of charities and corrections.


14. Ethel Church to Thompson, 27 November 1915, Adelina Otero-Warren to Martin, 4 December 1917, tray 8, box 3, NWP Papers, LC.

15. Otero-Warren to Mabel Vernon, 1 March 1920, tray 8, box 3, NWP Papers, LC.

16. Jessi M. Stroup to Alice Paul, 24 April 1914, Paul to Harriet L. Henderson, 19 July 1915, and Henderson to Paul, 5 July 1915. Henderson was president of the New Mexico WCTU at the time; Deane Lindsey vice president. Paul to Thompson 15 and 26 October 1915. Thompson to Paul, 16 October 1915 described mass meeting. Paul to Doris Stevens, 24 February 1916 on bombardment. Thompson to Mrs. Joshua Raynolds, 24 February 1916 on recruiting tactics. All in NWP Papers, tray 8, box 3, LC.


18. Biographical information on 107 women, prominently mentioned in NAWSA and NWP papers, was collected from: Women in New Mexico (Albu-

19. Thompson to Paul, 16 October 1915, NWP Papers, LC.
21. Otero-Warren to Paul, 4 December 1917, NWP Papers, LC.
22. Otero-Warren to Martin, 7 February 1918, NWP Papers, LC.
25. Morley to Martin, n.d., NWP Papers, LC.
26. Morley to Martin, 2 March 1916, Lindsey to Morley, 16 February 1916, NWP Papers, LC. A search of Catron’s papers reveals little correspondence from suffragists, but his files for 1915 are obviously incomplete, and no correspondence for 1916 is in the collection, Thomas Catron Papers, sect. 501, box 2, folder 25, UNM-SC.
30. Russell correspondence is in Republican Central Committee, Catron Papers, sect. 408, box 1, folder 19, UNM-SC.
York: Kraus Reprints, 1971) discuss the work of Jones on the amendment. Strong egalitarian statements by Jones are in U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, 65th Cong., 2nd sess., 1918, 56, pt. 7: 6306, pt. 11:10921.

33. Martin to Otero-Warren, 21, 29 December 1917; Lillian Kerr to Paul, 15 February 1920; Paul to Kerr, 15 February 1920; and Hernandez to R. L. Baca, 16 February 1920, NWP Papers, LC. Hernandez was reelected in 1918 and helped in the final state push for ratification.

34. Cora A. Kellam to Paul, 31 January, 18 March 1919, NWP Papers, LC.

35. Carrie Chapman Catt to Aloysius Larch-Miller, 22 October 1919, and “Reporter’s Transcript of Jubilee Convention of NAWSA,” St. Louis, 24–29 March 1919, NAWSA Papers, LC. Catt to Rosika Schwimmer, October 22, 1921, Catt Papers, container 8, LC. Early NAWSA-CU friction is discussed in Otero-Warren to Martin, 4 December 1917, Jane Pincus to Martin, 20 November 1917, and Stevens to Paul, 28 February 1916, NWP Papers, LC.

36. Catt to Grace Raymond Hebard, 30 December 1918, NAWSA Papers, container 84, LC. Harper, History of Woman Suffrage, 6: 437, for Larrazolo; Vernon to Otero-Warren, 21 January 1920, NWP, LC.

37. Otero-Warren to Paul, 21 January 1920, NWP Papers, LC.

38. Paul to Otero-Warren, 14 February 1920, Paul to Kerr, 14 February 1920, Paul to Clara S. Waller, 15 February 1920, Otero-Warren to Paul, 24 February 1920, NWP, LC. Republicans denied the plot and said the Democrats wanted to divide the Republicans.


40. New Mexico State Central Democratic Committee, box 3, UNM-SC. Republican records for 1920 have not yet been deposited in the archives. Women’s offices are listed in the New Mexico Blue Book, 1920–21.

41. The bilingual appeal is in Miscellaneous Records, Political Issues, SRCA. Three of seven women signing had Hispanic surnames.

42. I have used the listing of Hispanic and Little Texas counties from Holmes, Politics in New Mexico. Statistics on 1921 vote from Ernestine D. Evans, New Mexico Election Returns, 1911–1969 (Santa Fe, 1970).


45. Moorman, "A Political Biography," pp. 340-43, claims Otero-Warren's candidacy "spelled disaster" because of Hispanic opposition to women in high legislative office, but fusion between Independent Republicans and Democrats, including the popular leaders Cutting and Larrazolo, was probably more important for the worst Republican defeat since statehood. Everyone was defeated. Statistics from Evans, New Mexico Election Returns.

46. Post-1940 political participation remains to be studied, but a preliminary survey seems to indicate that, with the exception of Lusk's election during World War II, it was a period of retreat by women from public life. Two of the most powerful state legislators, Senator Louise Coe and Representative Concha Ortiz y Pino, retired from the legislature in 1941 and 1942 respectively (Furman, "Woman's Campaign," p. 370). Information on office holding is taken from New Mexico Blue Books, 1911-1941. Lusk's campaign is discussed in Roger D. Hardaway, "Georgia Lusk of New Mexico: A Political Biography" (Master's thesis, New Mexico State University, 1979). For a recent analysis of the political progress of women and Hispanics, see Cal Clark, Janet Clark, and José Z. Garcia, "Policy Impacts on Hispanics and Women: A State Case Study," in Marian Lief Palley and Michael B. Preston, eds., Race, Sex and Policy Problems (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1979).


49. Walter Dean Burnham. "The Changing Shape of the American Political Universe," American Political Science Review 59 (March 1965): 7-28, noted declining male participation before enfranchisement of women as parties lost their hold on masses of voters. Much of the decline in the South was due to disfranchisement of poor white and Black male voters. In the North, progressive measures such as voter registration and civil service reform also caused a decline. The trend bottomed out in 1924 and peaked again in 1940. Thus women's participation was a part of this overall trend (Flanigan and Zingale, Political Behavior, p. 15).